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COMMENTS ON A PAPER BY POSNER
RicaARD R. NELSON t
The paper by Posner is interesting both for what it says and
for the way it says it. He has written a good old-fashioned polemic
disguised as a reasonable man's survey of today's consensus position.
Posner proposes that "the Chicago school' no longer should be
viewed as one of the competing schools of thinking about industrial
organizations. In his opinion, it has become by now the only really
iespectable school of thinking, even though a couple of old fuddie
duddies from an older school fail to understand this. Posner con-
trasts the "old" school of industrial organization (Harvard) which
he proposes was atheoretic with the "new" school (Chicago) which
based itself rigorously on price theory. But the price theory to
which Posner refers is the old-fashioned price theory of the text-
books of twenty years ago. What Posner does not see is that over
the last decade or so a newer price theory is replacing the old. I
suggest that the new price theory probably provides better support
for the old industrial organization than it does for what Posner calls
the new. Indeed, the journals are full of a "new new" industrial
organization literature based on the newer price theory, viewing the
problem in a way that is more consistent with old Harvard than the
new Chicago.
I will make these remarks more explicit by first briefly dis-
cussing some of the propositions of the new industrial organization
that Posner claims are now consensus positions and then describing
some of the key elements of the new price theory and the new new
industrial organization.
Posner proposes that a significant achievement of the Chicago
school of industrial organization was to reveal that a number of the
vertical arrangements and policies-tie-in arrangements, resale price
maintenance, forward vertical integration-which made the old in-
dustrial organization economists nervous, are unlikely to extend the
monopoly power of the initiating firm. In general I believe Posner
is right in this regard. But the analytic argument hinges on the
proposition that the initiating firm initially was maximizing profits
and that consumers correctly maximize utility. What if the initiat-
ing firm is interested in sales as well as profits but is constrained
to earn at least a certain rate of return? Or what if consumers
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are not particularly good calculators of what a package of items
would cost them, and tend to pay attention primarily to the price
of the central commodity? An analysis of vertical arrangements
making one or the other of the above assumptions, and not assum-
ing faultless profit and utility maximization, might suggest that such
arrangements are not necessarily benign.
Posner argues that the Chicago school of industrial organiza-
tion has effectively been undermining the notions that barriers to
entry into an industry, stemming from scale economies and ad-
vertising, might be a problem. I think this proposition by Posner
reflects that he has been talking mainly to his friends. The Chicago
proposition that scale economies don't serve as a barrier to entry
hinges on explicit or implicit assumptions about perfect capital
markets and no adjustment lags or costs. Admit capital market
imperfections, and that getting into an industry takes time; then a
firm that is already present in the market has an advantage over an
entrant simply because the former is there and the latter is not.
Similar implicit assumptions, and others that I will mention later,
underlie the argument that an established brand name and past
advertising do not provide a barrier to entry. The Chicago prop-
ositions regarding these matters have not been very persuasive to
economists who were not predisposed to be persuaded.
Posner proposes that an important accomplishment of the new
industrial organization is that the old paranoia of some non-analytic
economists regarding advertisement has been shown up for what
it is, and that now all sensible (new or Chicago) industrial organi-
zation economists agree that advertising is desirable, because it
carries information, and not undesirable. Even the oldest of the
old style industrial organization economists, however, would con-
cede that in many cases advertising carries information. Surely it
helps consumers to know certain attributes of a product and the
product's price before they go to a store. But as I look at my tele-
vision set of an evening, I wonder what kind of information "great
balls of comfort" is meant to convey. Is it really information for
me to know that "if I'm out of Schlitz, I'm out of beer"? A sensible
analysis of advertising has to recognize that consumers have a wider
range of difficulty in making choices than is caught by the proposi-
tion that they may be uncertain about price and about certain
easily specifiable product attributes. Much of advertising reflects
firms' awareness of consumer uncertainty regarding what kind of
a product would be nice to have, taste, and live with. In the lan-
guage of the new new price theory, much of advertising involves
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signalling rather than providing information. And most models
that I know of in which signalling is an activity do not show that
natural market forces generate the right kind or amount of signal-
ling.
More generally, the old price theory on which the "new" in-
dustrial organization rested assumed faultless profit maximizing on
the part of firms and utility maximizing on the part of consumers
(sometimes in the expectational sense). It assumed long-run
equilibrium in markets. Some aspects of that old new price theory
treated uncertainty and search activity, and admitted transaction
and control costs. But these features tended to be introduced to
explain and justify certain phenomena, like advertising. They
were treated as addenda to or complications of the simple optimiza-
tion problem. The added problem, and the bigger problem, was
assumed to be solved optimally, with only limited explanation of
what might be involved for a super-optimization postulate to be
plausible as a characterization of the behavior of firms and con-
sumers. And there was an implicit carrying over of the "hidden
hand" theorems of the consonance of individual maximization and
social maximization that characterized the simpler structure to the
more complex one. This jump of reasoning, while perhaps plausi-
ble at first thought, has been shown to be quite unjustified by sub-
sequent research.
What I have called the "new new" price theory focuses on those
aspects of economic behavior that the old new price theory identi-
fied but did not analyze adequately-uncertainty and search, and
transaction and control costs. The emerging conclusions are chang-
ing significantly the way theorists view the strength and weaknesses
of market-guided systems.
The new new price theory takes as a basic premise that infor-
mation is costly to acquire, store, send, and process. It recognizes a
diversity of kinds of information in the system. When one analyzes
information systems carefully, one discerns important difficulties
with market-guided information allocations that were repressed in
analyses based on the old new price theory. For one, as mentioned
above, equilibria regarding signalling are extremely unlikely to be
Pareto optimal. For another, costly consumer search means that
one firm producing a product identical to those of other firms may
have a degree of "monopoly power."
The new new price theory also is characterized by closer atten-
tion to transaction and control costs and systems. The new insti-
tutional analysis has provided a number of insights into the merits
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of nonmarket mechanisms of interaction and transaction. But this
strand of analysis also has led to a deeper understanding of omni-
presence of frictions in both markets and hierarchies, and certainly
carries the implication that in a dynamic world it is highly unlikely
that prevailing structures are optimal in any non-sophistical sense.
This is not necessarily a position leading to enthusiam for interven-
tion. But the new new economic theorist no longer makes com-
pany with Pangloss.
There are signs that the new attention being paid to informa-
tion and organizational structures for patterning interactions is
leading to greater theoretical interest in innovation, the economic
structures that support and mold innovation, and the effect of in-
novation on economic structure. The old verbal ideas of Schum-
peter, which certainly were a part of the thinking of the old indus-
trial organization economists, are now beginning to receive serious
theoretical attention. And here too the "new new" economic
theory is emerging with insights about the strengths, and weak-
nesses, of market competition that diverge significantly from ortho-
dox views guided by an older price theory. In some of the new
models the Schumpeterian insights about the importance of a degree
of monopoly power as a base for innovation have been given rigorous
basis. These models call attention to a phenomenon neglected by
Schumpeter but feared by the "old" industrial organization econ-
omists-a tendency for dynamic competition to destroy competitive
structure.
In all three respects-a concern about information, internal
organizational structure, and dynamics-the recent theoretical de-
velopments are exploring issues that the old industrial organization
economists knew were important. If they were atheoretic, perhaps
the fault should be laid to the oversimplicity of the theory that
then was available. I find it interesting how many of the older
views are being supported by the new new price theory. The new
new theory provides comfort neither to those who travel with
Pangloss, nor to those that seem to see remediable monopoly prac-
tice or structure everywhere. The economic system is complex; it
works in a certain fashion, if not optimally. It may be easier to
identify warts than to perform surgery that does not leave scars or
have other nasty side effects. But this does not mean that a steady
alert and occasional operation are not called for. Maybe this really
is today's consensus of reasonable scholars.
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